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QXO | Earnings Review — Q2 2026

Verdict: ORGANICALLY DECELERATING. As-reported net sales $3,246 million (+70.3% vs stub-year-ago $1,906.4 million) is Kodiak ($595 million, 8-K EX-99.1) plus a full Beacon quarter versus a two-month 2025 stub. Strip Kodiak and compare to the last full Beacon Q2 ($2,674.6 million): −0.9%. The 10-Q Beacon Q2’25 pro forma ($2,693 million) versus this quarter ex-Kodiak ($2,651 million) is −1.6% — the honest demand tape.

Print (small double beat, low quality): Sales beat FMP $3,178.8 million by +$67 million / +2.1%. Adj. diluted EPS $0.08 vs $0.07863 (+$0.001 / +1.7%, in-line). GAAP remains a loss: $(55) million / $(0.14). Adj. EBITDA $272 million / 8.4% (−230 bps vs 10.7%). Adj. GM 24.7% (−60 bps); GAAP GM +360 bps is last year’s $80.3 million inventory step-up rolling off. 10-Q: product cost rose faster than selling prices.

Guidance: Still no FQ+1 or FY P&L range on the Q2 8-K EX-99.1. The July 9 Investor Q&A put a 2030 adj. EBITDA bridge on paper (~$2 billion combined 2025A → ~$4 billion organic / ~$5.5 billion with tuck-ins). The Aug 13 earnings 8-K stripped the dollars and retreated to “more than double EBITDA by 2030” and “$50 billion in revenue within the decade.” Street (FMP only; VA/Bloomberg not connected): Q3 $4.879 billion / $0.15 (+78.8% sales vs Q3’25 $2,728.3 million) is TopBuild + Kodiak + season, not a self-help test.

Tone: No Q2 call (IR: webcast not available). Jacobs’ one sentence: “current market conditions” and “we have begun upgrading technology.” Less specific than Q1’s “industry softness”; “firmly on track” to $50 billion was dropped. July 9 named the exam (sequential Beacon volumes, pricing, GM, FCF, delever) — Aug 13 answered none of it.

Contradictions (6): two High — “do not pay for synergies” vs TopBuild 11.8x after $300 million; GAAP GM +360 bps is PPA while adj. GM −60 bps and cost outran price.

Catalysts: Score Q3 on Beacon organic and adj. GM vs the −60 bps print, and whether TopBuild’s ~16.5% EBITDA mix lifts QXO off 8.4%. Do not treat a ~$4.9 billion sales print as thesis confirmation.

Read this series as a deal sawtooth, not an accelerating distributor. Daloopa 7272 carries Beacon through 2025Q1 and QXO consolidated thereafter (restated=false only). Beacon closed 29 Apr 2025 (2025Q2 is a ~2-month stub). Kodiak closed 1 Apr 2026. TopBuild closed 1 Jul 2026 — not in this quarter. Organic / existing-branch series stop at 2025Q1.

Line-of-business drivers ($M)

| Driver | Q3'23 | Q4'23 | Q1'24 | Q2'24 | Q3'24 | Q4'24 | Q1'25 | Q2'25* | Q3'25 | Q4'25 | Q1'26 | Q2'26 | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Resi roofing | 1,372.8 | 1,162.8 | 927.4 | 1,328.9 | 1,404.9 | 1,172.3 | 928.6 | 929.8 | 1,351.7 | 1,025.6 | 799.1 | 1,266 | | YoY % | +13.6 | +20.2 | +9.1 | +2.4 | +2.3 | +0.8 | +0.1 | n/m | −3.8 | −12.5 | −13.9 | +36.2 | | Non-res roofing | 675.2 | 626.7 | 528.6 | 745.1 | 739.0 | 661.4 | 501.3 | 535.5 | 734.0 | 614.4 | 463.6 | 736 | | YoY % | −7.6 | +11.4 | +17.6 | +11.1 | +9.4 | +5.5 | −5.2 | n/m | −0.7 | −7.1 | −7.5 | +37.4 | | Complementary | 536.3 | 510.0 | 456.4 | 600.6 | 628.7 | 569.9 | 477.9 | 426.1 | 628.5 | 538.1 | 452.9 | 1,229 | | YoY % | +12.7 | +16.0 | +5.4 | +12.3 | +17.2 | +11.7 | +4.7 | n/m | 0.0 | −5.6 | −5.2 | +188.4 | | Mix res/non-res/comp | 53/26/21 | 51/27/22 | 48/28/24 | 50/28/22 | 51/27/23 | 49/28/24 | 49/26/25 | 49/28/22 | 50/27/23 | 47/28/25 | 46/27/26 | 39/23/38 |

*2025Q2 Beacon stub. Software is noise ($15 million, 0% YoY). Existing-branch last printed 2025Q1 at $1,807.3 million vs $1,817.1 million (−0.5%).

Driver read: (1) Residential roofing was stalling into the deal (+13.6% → +2.4% → +0.1%) and is still shrinking on a two-year stack: Q2’26 $1,266 million is −4.7% vs Beacon Q2’24 $1,328.9 million. Combined roofing $2,002 million vs $2,074 million (−3.5%). (2) Complementary +188% is Kodiak. Residual complementary ~$634 million is only +5.6% vs Beacon Q2’24 $600.6 million. Mix 38% complementary vs 22% two years ago is a lower-margin lumber book replacing roofing — that is the adj. EBITDA margin compression.

Consolidated P&L (12 quarters)

| Metric | Q3'23 | Q4'23 | Q1'24 | Q2'24 | Q3'24 | Q4'24 | Q1'25 | Q2'25* | Q3'25 | Q4'25 | Q1'26 | Q2'26 | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Net sales ($M) | 2,584.3 | 2,299.5 | 1,912.4 | 2,674.6 | 2,772.6 | 2,403.6 | 1,907.8 | 1,906.4 | 2,728.3 | 2,194.1 | 1,730.2 | 3,246 | | Rev YoY % | +7.0 | +16.8 | +10.4 | +6.8 | +7.3 | +4.5 | −0.2 | n/m | −1.6 | −8.7 | −9.3 | +70.3 | | GAAP GM % | 26.0 | 25.7 | 24.7 | 25.6 | 26.3 | 25.7 | 24.5 | 21.1 | 23.3 | 24.2 | 23.7 | 24.7 | | Adj. GM % | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 25.3 | 25.2 | 24.2 | — | 24.7 | | Adj. EBITDA ($M) | 309.6 | 216.7 | 103.1 | 279.4 | 325.2 | 222.5 | 82.2 | 204.6 | 301.9 | 150.3 | 1.2 | 272 | | Adj. EBITDA mgn | 12.0% | 9.4% | 5.4% | 10.4% | 11.7% | 9.3% | 4.3% | 10.7% | 11.1% | 6.9% | 0.1% | 8.4% | | EBITDA mgn YoY bps | +20 | +30 | −110 | −120 | −30 | −10 | −110 | +30* | −60 | −240 | −420 | −230 | | Adj. dil. EPS ($) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.02 | −0.12 | 0.08 | | GAAP NI ($M) | 161.3 | 95.1 | 5.6 | 127.2 | 145.3 | 83.6 | −43.1 | −58.5 | −139.4 | −90.2 | −227.1 | −55 | | Adj. dil. shares (M) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 702.0 | 875.3 | 869.0 | 744.4 | 911.8 | | OCF ($M) | 167.0 | 262.1 | −140.8 | −48.4 | 248.8 | 359.8 | −135.2 | −2.5 | 212.5 | 186.6 | 70.6 | −216.6 |

Q2 same-quarter stack (the trajectory that matters)

| Q2 pair | Rev YoY | Adj. GM Δ | EBITDA mgn Δ | Adj. EPS YoY | Res YoY vs ’24 | Ex-Kodiak vs ’24 | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Q2'24 / Q2'23 | +6.8% | — | −120 bp | — | +2.4% | — | | Q2'25 / Q2'24 | −28.7% n/m (stub) | — | +30 bp* | n/m | n/m | n/m | | Q2'26 / Q2'25 | +70.3% n/m | −60 bp | −230 bp | −27.3% | +36.2% (stub) | +39.1% (stub) | | Q2'26 / Q2'24 (2-yr) | +21.4% | — | −200 bp | — | −4.7% | −0.9% |

Three things jump off the table. (1) Reported +70% is a calendar artifact. Clean QXO quarters before Kodiak: −1.6 → −8.7 → −9.3%. (2) Margins are compressing on mix, not expanding on scale. Adj. EBITDA $272 million is still −2.6% vs Beacon Q2’24 $279.4 million despite +21% sales. (3) EPS is dilution on a still-loss-making GAAP P&L: adj. NI $130 million +19%, adj. EPS −27% because shares went 702.0 million → 911.8 million. OCF $(217) million in a seasonally strong Q2 is a working-capital flag into TopBuild.

Net sales — 12 quarters ($B)

Annual arc (FY2021–FY2025) — Beacon then QXO stub

| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025† | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Net sales ($M) | 6,642.0 | 8,429.7 | 9,119.8 | 9,763.2 | 6,842.2 | | Rev YoY % | −4.3 | +26.9 | +8.2 | +7.1 | n/m | | Adj. EBITDA ($M) | 654.7 | 910.0 | 929.6 | 930.2 | 647.8 | | Adj. EBITDA mgn | 9.9% | 10.8% | 10.2% | 9.5% | 9.5% | | Resi roofing YoY | +13.4 | +20.0 | +10.3 | +3.9 | n/m |

†FY2025 is a partial-year QXO consolidation (Beacon from 29 Apr). Jacobs bought a peaked distributor: FY2022 was the last real growth year; FY2023–24 Adj. EBITDA dollars stuck at ~$930 million while margin rolled −60 then −70 bps. Q2’26’s 8.4% says the blended box earns less than Beacon did at the peak.

Small double beat vs a thin Street book — M&A arithmetic, not an operating snapback. Pattern: Mixed. Operating L4Q revenue 4/4, L4Q adj. EPS 3/4. Ticker L12Q 10/12 rev / 6/11 EPS is the software shell and is not Jacobs’ track record. Beat magnitude is not improving.

Heatmap — last 8 quarters (operating entity)

This quarter vs consensus (FMP)

| Metric | Consensus | Actual | Variance | Result | |---|---:|---:|---:|---| | Net sales | $3,178.8M | $3,246 million | +$67.2M / +2.1% | BEAT | | Adj. diluted EPS | $0.07863 | $0.08 | +$0.001 / +1.7% | BEAT (in-line) | | GAAP diluted EPS | n/a (FMP stores adj.) | $(0.14) | — | Loss | | Adj. EBITDA | n/a | $272 million | — | n/a vs Street | | Adj. EBITDA margin | n/a | 8.4% | −230 bps YoY | Compressed | | Adj. gross margin | n/a | 24.7% | −60 bps YoY | Compressed | | Formal company guide | None issued | — | — | No guide to beat |

Kodiak alone ($595 million) is 8.9× the $67 million sales surprise. Closest demand tape: Beacon Q2’25 pro forma $2,693 million vs ex-Kodiak $2,651 million (−1.6%).

Operating-window beat rates

| Window | Revenue | Adj. EPS | Usable? | |---|---|---|---| | L12Q ticker (2023Q3–2026Q2) | 10/12 (83%) | 6/11 (55%) | No — 7 of 12 are the software shell | | L5Q operating (2025Q2–2026Q2) | 4/5 (80%) | 4/5 (80%) | Partial — Q2’25 / Q3’25 estimate-quality | | L4Q operating (2025Q3–2026Q2) | 4/4 (100%) | 3/4 (75%) | Best available | | L3Q clean (2025Q4–2026Q2) | 3/3, all ≤2.1% | 2/3 (67%) | Honest run-rate vs Street |

This is not a team that sandbags and then crushes. It is a team that does not guide and then prints within a couple of percent of a sparse FMP book, while the organic/margin tape is softer than the headline.

Headline: QXO still issued no formal FQ+1 or FY+1 range. The only new numeric forward book sits outside the earnings release: the July 9 Q&A 2030 EBITDA bridge. Aug 13 then drops those dollars.

What was (not) guided

| Item | Q2 2026 earnings 8-K (Aug 13) | July 9 Investor Q&A | Prior (Q1 2026) | Status | |---|---|---|---|---| | Revenue FQ+1 / FY | None | Combined-company ~$18 billion 2025A (not a 2026/27 guide) | None | Still never issued | | Adj. / GAAP EPS | None | None | None | None | | Margin | None | 2030 “mid-teens” implied on the $5.5B case | None | No near-term range | | Organic / price / SSS | None. Kodiak added $595 million | Watch sequential Beacon volumes, pricing, GM, EBITDA, FCF | None | Still no organic bridge | | Deal timing | TopBuild closed July 1 | Same | “Expected Q3” | Delivered ~one quarter early | | Long-term revenue | “$50 billion within the decade” | Same $50B from ~$18B 2025A base | “Firmly on track” | Reiterated; “firmly on track” dropped | | Long-term EBITDA | “More than double by 2030” (base unspecified) | ~$2B → ~$4B organic / ~$5.5B tuck-in | Not on Q1 8-K; deal deck had $7.5B | Slogan on earnings; dollars in July FAQ | | Equity | None | “We do not currently foresee any near-term equity issuance.” | Jan raise + Series C for Kodiak | New qualitative pledge |

Implied math: $50 billion vs FY2025 $6,842.2 million is a 7.3× stack; vs FMP FY2026E $14.23 billion it is 3.5×; vs the July 9 ~$18 billion PF base it is 2.8×. From $18 billion to $50 billion by ~2034 is a ~13.6% CAGR if M&A continues — not an organic target. A $2.0 billion → $4.0 billion organic path is a 14.9% CAGR, half the Sep-2025 FAQ’s “Street 34% EBITDA CAGR,” and still unproven at 8.4% margin.

Waterfall — formal guide is zero; Street is the 2026 bar

| Step | Sales | What it is | |---|---:|---| | Prior / new formal FY2026 guide | — | None on either 8-K | | H1 2026 reported | $4,976.2M | $1,730.2 million + $3,246 million | | Street H2 2026 implied | $9,257.4M | Plug to FMP FY2026E; +88.1% YoY vs H2 2025 $4,922.4M | | FY2026E consensus | $14,233.6M | 12 analysts; range $14.13–$14.34B (coalesced on deal math) | | FY2027E consensus | $19,197.5M | +34.9%; first full year of the three-asset stack | | July 9 combined 2025A | ~$18,000M | Pro forma, not a 2026 guide | | Long-term slogan | $50,000M | Not a dated range |

Do not use FMP EBITDA. FMP “EBITDA avg” sits at a mechanical ~20% of sales (FY2026E $2.883 billion). Reported FY2025 adj. EBITDA was $647.8 million / 9.5%; Q2 printed 8.4%. That ~1,200 bp gap is a vendor artifact.

FQ+1 / FY+1 vs Street (company cells empty)

| Metric | Q3 2026E (FQ+1) | FY2026E | FY2027E (FY+1) | |---|---:|---:|---:| | Co. guide | None | None | None | | Street sales | $4,878.7M (+78.8% vs $2,728.3 million) | $14,233.6M (+108% vs $6,842.2 million) | $19,197.5M (+34.9%) | | Street adj. EPS | $0.15 (+7.1% vs $0.14) | $0.2744 (−19.3% vs FY25 adj. $0.34) | $0.6504 (+137%) |

Sales +79% / EPS +7% in Q3 is dilution + mix, not operating leverage. H1 adj. EPS is already a hole: Q1 $(0.12) + Q2 $0.08 = $(0.04). Hitting $0.27 requires ~$0.31 of H2 after a larger post-TopBuild share count.

Tone: Q1 → July 9 → Q2 earnings

| Dimension | Q1 2026 8-K | July 9 Q&A | Q2 2026 8-K | |---|---|---|---| | Formal guide | None | No 2026/27 range; 2030 dollar bridge | None; 2030 dollars not restated | | End-market | “Softness in the building products industry” | “Weak building environment”; “low point in several end markets” | “Current market conditions” — vaguer | | Confidence | “Firmly on track” to $50B | “Clear line of sight” on 2030 | “Firmly on track” removed; scale-achieved language | | Mix | Sep-2025 FAQ ~80% R&R | ~50/50 new / R&R after TopBuild | Not restated |

Predecessor Beacon FY2024 adj. EBITDA $930.2 million hit a raised band — that record is not transferable to Jacobs/Manduca. QXO-era earnings-8-K score: 0 formal 2026/27 P&L promises, 0 hits, 0 misses. Deal-close credibility is the exception.

8-quarter trajectory (Accel = change in the YoY rate vs the prior quarter, in bps — second derivative, not sequential revenue).

| Metric | 2024Q3 | 2024Q4 | 2025Q1 | 2025Q2 | 2025Q3 | 2025Q4 | 2026Q1 | 2026Q2 | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Revenue YoY % | +7.3 | +4.5 | −0.2 | −28.7* | −1.6 | −8.7 | −9.3 | +70.3† | | Rev Accel (bps) | +46 | −276 | −477 | −2,848* | +2,713* | −712 | −59 | +7,958† | | Adj. EPS YoY % | n/m | n/m | n/m | n/m | n/m | n/m | n/m | −27.3 |

*Stub artifact. †Kodiak + stub anniversary. 2026Q2 is the first clean QXO-era adj. EPS YoY.

Inflection map

| Quarter | Signal | What happened | |---|---|---| | 2024Q3 → 2024Q4 | Growth decelerates while still positive | +7.3% → +4.5% (−276 bps). Last fully-owned Beacon year fading; organic volumes already negative on the Q4 call. | | 2025Q1 | Revenue growth goes negative | −0.2% (−477 bps). Last Beacon-standalone quarter. Adj. NI −83.8% to $4.3 million. | | 2025Q2 | Stub artifact (not an operating trough) | −28.7%. Beacon in the print only from 29 Apr. Do not read as demand. | | 2025Q3 | First clean post-deal quarter — still negative | −1.6%. The +2,713 bps Accel is the stub reversing. Adj. EPS $0.14 is the QXO-era peak; unmatched since. | | 2025Q4 → 2026Q1 | Contraction deepens; earnings trough | −8.7% then −9.3%. Q1 adj. EBITDA $1.2 million / 0.1%; resi roofing −13.9%. | | 2026Q2 | As-reported spike; operating franchise still flat-to-down | +70.3% / +7,958 bps is Kodiak + stub. Ex-Kodiak vs Beacon Q2’24: −0.9%. Adj. EPS −27.3%. Margin −230 bps. TopBuild not in the quarter. |

Net verdict: not an inflection higher. Strip the two reporting artifacts and the path is +7.3% → +4.5% → −0.2% → −1.6% → −8.7% → −9.3%. The $3.25 billion print is a bigger company because QXO bought one. Adj. EBITDA including Kodiak is −2.6% vs Beacon Q2 2024. TopBuild will reset the run-rate again in Q3; until there is a clean Beacon+Kodiak vs Beacon+Kodiak quarter, treat headline YoY as deal arithmetic.

The November print is not whether QXO will print a larger company — TopBuild closed July 1 and is absent from Q2. FMP already parks Q3 at $4.879 billion / $0.15. That bar does not require self-help. What Q3 tests, and what Jacobs told investors to watch, is whether legacy Beacon volumes, pricing, and gross margin inflect while TopBuild’s mix lifts company margin off 8.4%.

| # | Catalyst | Timing | Street / bar | Score it on | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | First TopBuild-consolidated print | FMP 2026-11-05 | $4.879B / $0.15 = Q2 $3,246M + ~$1.4B TopBuild + seasonal residual | Whether Beacon+Kodiak residual is ≥ ~$3.45B; any organic disclosure. A $4.7–$5.0B print is mostly math. | | 2 | Adj. EBITDA margin mix-up | Q3 print | No quarterly adj. EBITDA Street. Debate: does margin inflect toward low-double digits as TopBuild ~16.5% lands on 8.4%? | If Q3 stays ~8–9%, TopBuild is arriving compressed and the 2030 $4B organic bridge is behind on day one. | | 3 | Legacy Beacon sequential volumes | Continuous; scored at Q3 | No FMP organic line. No Daloopa organic after 2025Q1. | This is the self-help KPI Street cannot see in $4.879B. Mix now ~50/50 new vs R&R — higher housing-start beta than the 2025 80% R&R story. | | 4 | Adj. GM vs the −60 bps print | Q3 print | Q3’25 adj. GM was 25.2%. TopBuild Q1 GAAP GM 27.7% should lift mix. | If adj. GM does not inflect despite adding a 27–28% GM business, price/procurement is still going the wrong way. Watch adj. GM, not GAAP (PPA will hit Q3 COGS). | | 5 | Tech stack (2027-dated) | Beacon core end-Q1 2027; Kodiak/TopBuild end-Q3 2027 | FMP FY2027E +34.9% sales already bakes the year Jacobs dated “accelerated organic growth.” | Not a Q3 P&L catalyst. Q3 can only slip it. Software line still $15 million (0% YoY) — tech is opex, not a software business. Transformation cost $24 million (+103% YoY). | | 6 | Cross-sell / private label / $5.3B shared spend | Multi-year; first color Q3/Q4 | $300M TopBuild synergies are 2030, not 2026 | Silence + margin compression = levers still slides. | | 7 | Deleveraging / “no near-term equity” | YE2026 / Q3 10-Q | Q2 LT debt $6,029 million; H1 OCF $(146) million | Q3 FCF sign is the credibility check on the July equity pledge. Interest $38 million in Q2 before notes left escrow. | | 8 | Housing / mortgage overlay | Census + FOMC into Q4 | Street’s $4.879B does not need a housing bounce | Macro is a Q3 risk, not the Q3 bar. 50% new-construction mix makes starts/rates matter more than in 2025. | | 9 | Share count / preferreds | Q3 first full period with ~312M TopBuild shares | FMP $0.15 on an unspecified diluted count; Q2 adj. diluted already 911.8 million | Model adj. NI to common ($73 million on $130 million of adj. NI in Q2). A $0.12 print on a $4.9B “beat” would be the dilution tell. | | 10 | Digestion vs next large deal | Any 8-K | July Q&A took large deals off the near-term table | A surprise large deal before Q3 would be a negative (leverage + equity + digestion). |

No public Q2 2026 earnings call. IR lists the webcast as unavailable. FMP transcript dates still end at Beacon FY2024 Q4 (2025-02-27). Daloopa has no Transcript filing_type in 2026Q1–Q3. The last real answers are the July 9, 2026 Investor Q&A — 23 written, company-selected questions, five weeks before this print.

A prepared FAQ is marketing until the subsequent print reports the proof points management itself named. Aug 13 failed the exam Jacobs wrote.

Scoreboard — July 9 Q&A (primary) + Aug 13 void

| # | Question (abridged) | Badge | |---|---|---| | 5 | Why TopBuild? | Well Answered (22k job sites/day) | | 7 | Integrate without disruption? | Deflected (process, no $ or calendar) | | 8 | What proof points to watch? | Well Answered as a list — print then ignored it | | 9 | Path to ~$4B / ~$5.5B by 2030? | Deflected (2030 yes; 2026–27 no) | | 10 | Housing recovery vs self-help? | Well Answered (~50/50 mix reset) | | 11 | Biggest margin opportunities? | Well Answered ($5.3B overlapping vendor spend) | | 12 | Confidence doubling Beacon EBITDA? | Deflected (levers, no bridge) | | 18 | Where is the tech rollout? | Well Answered (Q1’27 / Q3’27 dates) | | 21 | Plan to de-lever? | Deflected (no target ratio or year) | | 22 | Near-term equity issuance? | Well Answered (“do not currently foresee”) | | 23 | Digestion mode? | Well Answered | | — | Q2 2026 live call (all follow-ups) | Avoided (no call) |

Tally of 13 scored July items: 9 Well Answered · 4 Deflected, plus the entire Aug 13 live session avoided. Every “Well Answered” badge is a written answer, not a live follow-up. The company chose the questions.

Highest-content answers vs what Q2 then printed

• Q8 proof points: sequential Beacon volumes, pricing, procurement, GM, EBITDA; FCF and deleveraging. “The next phase is not asset assembly.” The release reports none of those sequential operating stats.
• Q9 bridge: Beacon ~$800 million → ~$2 billion; Kodiak ~$210 million → ~$400 million; TopBuild ~$1.1 billion → ~$1.6 billion; tuck-ins to ~$5.5 billion. Missing middle: no 2026/27 waypoint. Earnings 8-K did not restate the dollars.
• Q10 mix: ~50/50 new vs R&R, ~60/40 res vs commercial — a thesis change vs Sep-2025 80% R&R.
• Q18 dates: Beacon stack “substantially complete by end of Q1 2027”; Kodiak/TopBuild by end of Q3 2027. Then Aug 13: “we have begun upgrading technology” — weaker tense than “meaningful progress” five weeks earlier.
• Q22: no near-term equity. Grades against the next raise, and against Q3 FCF after H1 OCF was a use of cash.

What the Street would have pressed and did not get to: organic/same-store, price vs cost (10-Q admits cost > price), sequential Beacon GM, leverage target, 2026/27 P&L range after the gating deal closed, GAAP vs adj. quality ($52 million transaction + $24 million transformation).

Six document-backed items (2 High, 3 Medium, 1 Low). No Q2 call to soften any of them.

Not counted: “More than double EBITDA by 2030” vs July’s $2B → $4B (the FAQ supplies the omitted baseline). TopBuild $17 billion headline vs ~$15 billion GAAP purchase price at close (stock leg marked down). Beacon-era 80% reroofing vs Jacobs Sep-2025 80/20 (same perimeter, different owner).

No Q2 call. Macro and counterparty color is the July 9 Q&A plus the Aug 13 one-liner. Jacobs is not giving a housing-recovery print. He is describing a trough-building, self-help tape with higher new-construction mix after TopBuild and data centers as the only named industrial tailwind. Complementary mix +1,550 bps is Kodiak lumber, not a roofing-cycle boom.

Macro

| Bucket | Signal (Jul 9 + Aug 13) | Direction | |---|---|---| | Rates / new housing | Mortgage rates “do matter”; no recovery underwritten; mix now ~50/50 new vs R&R | More rate-exposed after TopBuild; new construction still the soft sleeve | | Inflation / price | Adj. GM −60 bps; 10-Q cost > price; procurement + private-label as the response | Price/cost not yet expanding; OEM rebate pressure is the intended path | | Consumer | No UMICH/Conference Board. Affordability + aging stock + housing deficit | R&R structural; new-home consumer still blocked. Not a HD/LOW DIY print | | Industrial / construction | “Weak building environment” / “low point in several end markets”; data centers named | Trough industrial + one capex overlay (data-center envelope) | | Storms | Mentioned as a roofing variable; not quantified | No 2026 storm read — do not carry 2024 hurricane math | | Labor | TopBuild installer base as advantage (~22,000 job sites/day) | Better for owned-labor models; worse for unintegrated contractors |

Suppliers

| Counterparty | Datapoint | Implication | |---|---|---| | Overlapping vendors (~$5.3 billion; 16 of Kodiak top 20 = Beacon) — named, current | July 9: largest financial benefit of scale is procurement | Worse for commoditized OEM accessories / overlapping lumber-gypsum (rebate compression, private-label substitution). Sheltered for specified commercial (CSL) — Jacobs says he will not force private label on highly specified systems. Highest-signal supplier read. Confidence: high on intent, moderate on magnitude (no rebate $ in Q2). | | Owens Corning (OC) — implied | Combined QXO is now #1 insulation distributor/installer | Mixed / likely worse as a customer (scale buyer can steer mix and compress rebates); insulation install pull-through can support volume if the category grows. Do not treat Q2 complementary mix as an OC volume print. | | GAF / CertainTeed / accessory OEMs — implied | Private label aimed at accessories, underlayment, waterproofing | Rebate and private-label risk. Channel still needs branches — negotiation leverage, not disintermediation. |

Customers

| Counterparty | Datapoint | Implication | |---|---|---| | Homebuilders / GCs (DHI, LEN, PHM, NVR, TOL) — named as type | Cross-sell “much easier with builders, GCs, and data-center jobs”; still a “weak building environment” | Better service if one-stop envelope is real; worse if procurement scale shows up as price to the builder. Demand read is not constructive — Jacobs will not underwrite a starts recovery. | | Data-center GCs / hyperscale shell contractors — named as end-market | Durable demand driver; highest-conviction cross-sell use case | Better for envelope content (insulation, roofing, gypsum, waterproofing). Not a power/cooling/GPU read — QXO is selling building products into the building. Confidence moderate (strategy, no $ mix). | | Independent roofing / insulation contractors | TopBuild labor as “significant strategic advantage” | Worse for independent insulation contractors competing with a 22,000-jobsite/day machine. Dual-role (sells to and competes with installers) is the channel-conflict watch item. |

Competitors / industry

| Counterparty | Datapoint | Implication | |---|---|---| | TopBuild (BLD) — acquired Jul 1 | Not in Q2 results. ~22k sites/day; “already best-in-class margin profile.” Internal bridge ~$1.1B → ~$1.6B EBITDA by 2030 | BLD equity is gone. Q3 is the first combined print — this Q2 is not a TopBuild operating read. Remaining insulation peers face a worse customer. | | Kodiak — $595 million of Q2 sales | Complementary $1,229 million +188.4% | Worse for independent lumber yards and BLDR/BXC in Kodiak geos if density + Beacon roofing cross-sell works. Complementary +188% is acquisition, not a starts print. | | Beacon legacy | $800 million → $2 billion is the largest self-help claim | Better for QXO only if sequential Beacon GM/volume inflect. Q2 adj. GM −60 bps is not that inflection. Do not treat +36% resi roofing dollars as share gains vs ABC / HD-SRS. | | HD / LOW — named Sep 2025, not re-cut | “They’ll probably outbid us anytime we go after the same acquisition target” | HD is the M&A ceiling, not the operating peer QXO wants to fight on price. Neutral on DIY SSS. | | BLDR / BCC / BXC — implied LBM | QXO claims #2 public LBM distributor | Competitive in Kodiak geos. BLDR Q2 core organic −7.0% is the closest public tape to Kodiak — not a national lumber-cycle boom in QXO’s +188%. | | GMS / FERG — implied | Gypsum via Kodiak; “narrow and deep” | Mildly worse for GMS where interiors overlap. Mostly neutral for FERG unless QXO later walks into mechanical. |

Headline takeaway: use this print as a soft-channel / trough-building read, not as a positive read-through to starts, existing-home sales, or shingle volumes. The companies that should care are new-construction distributors and builders (softer), insulation/envelope names on data-center jobs (better, if the cross-sell is real), and roofing OEMs facing a scale buyer with $5.3 billion of overlapping vendor spend (worse on rebates/private label).

Positioned view. Underwrite deal-close execution (Kodiak 4/1, TopBuild 7/1, ~one quarter early). Do not underwrite Beacon organic recovery, near-term margin expansion, or the 2030 $4 billion / $5.5 billion bridge until Q3 discloses sequential Beacon volume/GM and adj. EBITDA margin inflects off 8.4%. The small double beat is Kodiak + stub math against a thin FMP book. Formal 2026/27 guidance still missing after the gating deal closed — the opposite of an accountability step-up.

Data sourced from Daloopa