DOCN | Management Quality: 8/10
Data note. Daloopa is not connected in this session (see company_resolver.json), so no daloopa.com/src citations are possible. Actuals come from FMP /stable quarterly income, cash flow and balance sheet statements (pulled 2026-10-16, SEC-derived) and from management's own reported figures in the subsequent earnings calls (transcripts/ folder, FMP). Insider data is from FMP /stable/insider-trading and SEC Form 4 filings. Every number below should be re-tied to Daloopa once the connector is re-authorized.
Leadership. CEO Paddy Srinivasan (started Feb 2024; replaced Yancey Spruill under the succession plan announced 2023-08-24) and CFO Matt Steinfort (since Jan 2023, ex-Zayo CFO, BusinessWire) appear on all 8 calls, FY2024Q3 through FY2026Q2. The CEO change is about 2.7 years old, just outside the 2-year red-flag window. Below the CEO/CFO level there was a new CPTO (Vinay Kumar, first Form 4 Jan 2026) and IR changed hands (Melanie Strate to Radu Patrichi in 2026). So the current pairing has roughly 2.7 years of guidance history together, not 3+.
Promise tracking (promises made 4+ quarters ago, scored against reported actuals)
| Promise (Source) | Timeframe | Actual Result | Hit/Miss |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY24 revenue $775M to $777M (Q3'24 call) | FY2024 | $780.6M (sum of FMP quarterly rev 184.7/192.5/198.5/204.9) | Hit (beat) |
| Q4'24 revenue $199M to $201M (Q3'24) | Q4 2024 | $204.9M (FMP) | Hit (beat) |
| FY24 adj. EBITDA margin 40% to 41% (Q3'24) | FY2024 | 42% (Q4'24 call) | Hit (beat) |
| FY24 adj. FCF margin 15% to 17% (Q3'24) | FY2024 | 17% (Q4'24 call) | Hit |
| Enter 2025 with low to mid-teens baseline growth (Q3'24) | FY2025 | FY25 revenue $901M, +15.4% YoY | Hit |
| FY25 revenue $870M to $890M (Q4'24) | FY2025 | $901M (Q4'25 call; FMP quarters sum $901.4M) | Hit (beat top end) |
| Q1'25 revenue $207M to $209M (Q4'24) | Q1 2025 | $210.7M (FMP) | Hit (beat) |
| FY25 adj. EBITDA margin 38% to 40% (Q4'24) | FY2025 | 42% ($375M) (Q4'25 call) | Hit (beat) |
| FY25 non-GAAP EPS $1.85 to $1.95 (Q1'25) | FY2025 | $2.12 (Q4'25 call) | Hit (beat) |
| FY25 adj. FCF margin 16% to 18% (Q4'24) | FY2025 | 19% ($168M) (Q4'25 call) | Hit (beat) |
| Q1'25 FCF dips, "quickly return to higher margins in Q2" (Q4'24) | Q2 2025 | Q2'25 adj. FCF $57M, 26% of revenue | Hit |
| Customer expansion neutral to slightly positive in 2025 (NDR above 100%) (Q4'24) | FY2025 | Total NDR held at 99% through Q2/Q3'25 | Miss |
| NDR to stay in a similar range for the rest of 2025 (Q1'25) | FY2025 | 99% in Q2'25 and Q3'25 | Hit |
| Refinance 2026 convert before it goes current at YE25 (Q4'24) | by Dec 2025 | Done Q3'25: $625M 2030 convert plus $380M Term Loan A, most 2026 notes repurchased | Hit |
| Q2'25 revenue $215.5M to $217.5M; EBITDA margin 38% to 40% (Q1'25) | Q2 2025 | $218.7M; 41% | Hit (beat) |
| Q3'25 revenue $226M to $227M (Q2'25) | Q3 2025 | $229.6M (FMP; $230M per call) | Hit (beat) |
| FY25 adj. FCF margin raised to 17% to 19% (Q2'25) | FY2025 | 19% | Hit |
| 2027 revenue growth target of 18% to 20% (Investor Day Apr 2025, reiterated Q3'25 for 2026) | FY2026 | H1'26 growth 22% and 29%; FY26 guide now about 30.5% | Hit (tracking well ahead) |
| 2026 adj. EBITDA margin "high 30s to 40%" (Q3'25) | FY2026 | Current FY26 guide about 39%; H1'26 41% / 40% | Hit (tracking) |
| 2026 adj. FCF margin "mid to high teens" (Q3'25); 18% to 20% unlevered (Q4'25) | FY2026 | FY26 guide reset to 9% to 12% (Q1'26), now 11% to 13%, after about $100M of startup costs for added 2027 capacity | Miss |
Hit rate: 18 of 20 = 90%. Revenue guidance was beaten in all 8 quarters reviewed (Q3'24 to Q2'26). Q1'26 came in at $257.9M against a $249M to $250M guide, and Q2'26 at $281.2M against $272M to $274M.
Guidance revision pattern (raises vs cuts)
| Guide | Initial | Revisions | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY24 revenue | Feb 2024 guide (pre-window, not verified from local transcripts) | Raised to $775M to $777M (Q3'24) | $780.6M, beat |
| FY25 revenue | $870M to $890M (Q4'24) | Held (Q1'25), raised to $888M to $892M (Q2'25), raised to $896M to $897M (Q3'25) | $901M, beat |
| FY25 EPS | $1.85 to $1.95 | Raised to $2.05 to $2.10 (Q2'25), $2.00 to $2.05 after refinancing cost (Q3'25) | $2.12, beat |
| FY26 revenue growth | 18% to 20% (Q3'25 prelim) | 19% to 23% (Q4'25), 25% to 27% / $1.13B to $1.145B (Q1'26), about 30.5% / $1.17B to $1.18B (Q2'26) | Raised 3 times |
| FY26 EPS | $0.75 to $1.00 (Q4'25) | $1.10+ (Q1'26), about $1.40 (Q2'26) | Raised 2 times |
| FY26 adj. FCF margin | 18% to 20% unlevered (Q4'25) | 9% to 12% adjusted (Q1'26), raised to 11% to 13% (Q2'26) | Cut, then partly restored |
| 2027 revenue growth | 18% to 20% (Investor Day 2025) | 30% (Q4'25), 50%+ / >$1.7B (Q1'26), reaffirmed 50%+ (Q2'26) | Raised 2 times |
The pattern is beat-and-raise. The one exception is the FY26 FCF margin. Management moved from an unlevered to an adjusted basis and chose to pull forward about $100M of startup costs for 60MW of 2027 capacity after the $888M equity raise. On their numbers, excluding those costs, FY26 would be 18% to 21%, above the prior guide. That reset was driven by an investment decision, not by the business underperforming. It is still a lower headline number, and it should be watched.
Red-flag checklist
| Red flag | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| CEO/CFO change in last 2 years | No | CEO since Feb 2024 (~2.7 yrs), CFO since Jan 2023 |
| Guidance withdrawn or substantially lowered | No (watch) | No revenue, EBITDA or EPS cut. The FY26 FCF margin reset (18% to 20% unlevered to 9% to 12% adjusted) came with a basis change and discretionary 2027 capex, so it is not counted, but it is the nearest miss |
| Restatement / material weakness | No (in window) | A tax-accounting material weakness in the FY2023 10-K was remediated as of 12/31/2024 per the FY2024 10-K (SEC). No restatement found |
| Insider selling >$10M in 12 months, no buying | Yes (-1) | Oct 2025 to Sep 2026 (FMP insider feed): officers and directors sold ~$17.0M (Steinfort $7.7M, Jenson $3.0M, Srinivasan $2.9M, Barrett $2.2M, others $1.2M), mostly under 10b5-1 plans and after RSU vests. Access Industries (affiliate of a 10% owner) sold ~$557M in May 2026. Zero open-market buys |
| Revenue up, FCF down 3+ quarters | No (watch) | FMP GAAP FCF: Q2'25 $59.2M, Q3'25 $57.3M, Q4'25 -$108.1M, Q1'26 $2.2M, Q2'26 $63.5M. FCF fell for two quarters, then rebounded. TTM GAAP FCF is ~$15M on a heavy capex ramp |
| Failed / value-destroying M&A | No | No material M&A in window. Pre-window Paperspace (2023) underpins the AI platform; AI customer ARR is $234M, +212% |
| Debt growing faster than revenue 3+ quarters | No | FMP total debt: $1.76B (Q2'25), $1.59B, $0.73B, $0.90B, $1.50B (Q2'26). Two quarters of increase. $472M of 2030 converts were equitized in Jul 2026, and pro forma net leverage is 0.7x per the Q2'26 call |
Red flags counted: 1.
Scoring math
- Base 9: 90% hit rate, stable CEO/CFO for 2+ years, consistent beat-and-raise on revenue, EBITDA and EPS. Not a 10, because the current CEO/CFO pairing has only ~2.7 years of guidance history and the FY26 FCF guide was reset.
- Red flag: insider selling, -1. Final 8/10, which sits in the 7 to 8 band (>80% hit rate, stable leadership, beat-and-raise, at most 1 red flag).
Assessment. This is a credible, conservative-guiding team. Revenue beat the guide in all 8 quarters reviewed. FY25 revenue guidance was raised three times and FY26 three times so far. The 2027 growth target set at the April 2025 Investor Day (18% to 20%) was reached in 2026, and the outlook is now 50%+. Promise delivery is 90%. The misses are NDR, which management promised would turn into a tailwind in 2025 but held at 99%, and the FY26 FCF margin reset, which management chose in order to pre-fund 2027 capacity. Leadership has been stable under Srinivasan and Steinfort. The CEO's tenure is just under three years, so the 3+ year standard for a 10 is not met. The one red flag is insider selling with no buying: about $17M from officers and directors, mostly scheduled 10b5-1 sales, plus about $557M from the Access Industries holder. The things to watch are capital intensity and the move from self-funded growth to equity, converts and equipment financing (diluted shares went from about 94M to 127M over two years). If management keeps beating while GAAP FCF recovers from near zero TTM, the score holds. If the FY26 FCF guide slips again, that would be a second red flag.