Thematic Exposure -- 8/10
A ~98%-share, S&P DJI-licensed near-monopoly in SPX/VIX/Mini-SPX/Russell 2000 index options
(~47% of net revenue), clearing the oligopoly gate by roughly 3x and still accelerating on
record SPX volumes and real pricing power. Not a 9-10 because the reported Options segment
(63% of revenue) blends that monopoly with a genuinely fragmenting multi-listed options
business, and the remaining ~37% of total revenue is commoditized and replaceable within
months.
Weight: 35%
Index Options Share
Q4'25, S&P DJI exclusive license
% of Company Revenue
47.1%
Index options sub-segment, FY2025
Rate Per Contract
+19%
YoY, Q1'26 -- real pricing power
License Horizon
~2032
S&P DJI exclusivity horizon
Segment map -- FY2025 net revenue
| Segment |
% Revenue |
Market Share |
Theme Growth |
| — Index options (SPX/VIX/Mini-SPX/RUT) |
47.1% |
~98% (near-exclusive license) |
SPX ADV records every quarter; RPC +19% YoY (Q1'26); 0DTE penetration 61% of SPX volume, up from 51% a year earlier |
| — Multi-listed options |
9.2% |
~22-25%, falling (Nasdaq ~29%, MIAX ~17-19% rising) |
"Number one in overall market share" per Q4'25 transcript, but share erosion continues quarter over quarter |
| North American Equities |
16.8% |
Low-double-digit share; 10+ registered venues |
Net revenue +18% YoY (Q1'26), driven by industry volume, not share gains |
| Europe and Asia Pacific |
11.3% |
Largest single MTF (~22-27%); vs. Euronext, LSE, Deutsche Börse -- fragmented |
Net revenue +32% YoY (Q1'26), records across Periodic Auctions, Closing Cross, BIDS VWAP-X |
| Futures |
5.2% |
VIX futures effectively Cboe-exclusive; CME dominates broader TAM |
Slowest-growing segment; net revenue +9% YoY (Q1'26) |
| Global FX |
3.8% |
Small institutional ECN vs. EBS/Refinitiv/360T -- fragmented |
Fastest %-growth segment (+38% YoY Q1'26) off smallest base |
| Cboe DataVantage (cross-segment) |
n/a |
Fragmented vs. Bloomberg/LSEG -- but SPX/VIX datasets exclusive |
+19% YoY (Q1'26); FY26 guided low-double-digit organic growth |
| Event / prediction markets (emerging) |
<1% |
~0% -- Kalshi ~83-90% of CFTC-regulated volume |
Kalshi + Polymarket monthly volume ~$24B (Apr'26), up from <$5B Sept'25 -- upside optionality, not yet a moat |
Source:
Daloopa segment data, verbatim FMP earnings-call transcripts (Q2'25-Q1'26).
The three gating questions
1. How many competitors have >15% share, per segment?
Index options: zero -- a true monopoly. Multi-listed options: three
(Nasdaq ~29%, Cboe ~22-25%, MIAX ~17-19%), fragmenting further. NA Equities and Europe:
fragmented across 10+ venues. Event contracts: one (Kalshi) -- Cboe not yet in this list.
2. Could a customer replace this company within 12 months?
SPX/VIX: no -- exclusive S&P DJI license, OCC-cleared, reportedly
locked through ~2032, reinforced by genuine network effects (34 connected broker
platforms, 20 market-making groups, 11 floor-broker groups). Multi-listed options, NA
equities, Europe equities, FX: yes -- brokers already route the same order
across 15-20+ competing venues in real time.
3. Does the company set or take prices?
Index options: Cboe sets price (RPC +19% YoY, real pricing power).
Multi-listed options, NA equities, Europe, FX: Cboe is a price-taker in an
explicit fee/rebate competitive war against MIAX and Nasdaq.
Why the durable part is durable
The durable moat is narrow but deep: SPX/VIX/Mini-SPX/RUT (~47% of revenue) sits on an
exclusive index license, OCC-cleared portfolio-margining lock-in (MAG10, single-name 0DTE,
and binary/event contracts all land in the same OCC risk pool, deepening rather than diluting
the moat), and a 43-year-old trading floor management says "cannot be replicated
electronically" -- with a diversified buyer base (retail brokers, international brokers,
institutional hedgers, market makers). The rest of the company (~53% of revenue) is
replaceable, price-taking, and earns its growth from industry volume, not structural scarcity.
Event/prediction markets are optionality on the same moat, currently at 0% share against an
entrenched Kalshi.
The unresolved tension: is the moat gaining or losing share of the business?
Mix-shift watch item
The blended Options segment (which mixes the ~98%-share monopoly with the fragmenting
multi-listed business) grew +33.6%/+32.7% YoY in the last two quarters -- but the
unambiguously fragmented, price-taking segments (Europe & APAC +32.4%, Global FX
+38.0%) are growing at the same or a faster clip, off smaller bases. The pure index-options
sub-segment is never given its own isolated YoY revenue growth figure in company
disclosure -- only ADV records and RPC -- so it remains genuinely unclear whether the
moat's share of total revenue is expanding or eroding.
Assessment
Cboe scores an 8/10: the oligopoly gate clears with room to spare via a ~98%-share, license-protected monopoly generating ~47% of revenue and still accelerating (SPX ADV records every quarter, 0DTE penetration rising, RPC up double digits on real pricing power). Not a 9-10 because the "Options" segment as reported (63% of revenue) blends that monopoly with a genuinely fragmenting multi-listed options business (Cboe share falling as MIAX grows), and the remaining ~37% of total revenue is commoditized and replaceable within months. The emerging event-contracts opportunity is a legitimate call option on the same moat (OCC clearing, regulatory credibility, existing distribution) but currently carries 0% share against an entrenched Kalshi -- upside, not current-state score support.
Data sourced from
Daloopa and verbatim FMP earnings-call transcripts. Full detail: tickers/CBOE/data/review_workspaces/2026-07-24/final_score.md.