AMC | Earnings Review — Q2 2026

Q2 2026 is the standout print in the entire dataset covered by this review. Revenue of $1,596.7 million is the highest quarter in the 16-quarter Daloopa history (prior high: $1,405.9M in 2023Q3), up +14.2% YoY, and beat Zacks consensus of $1.510B by +5.7%. Adjusted EBITDA of $321.4 million also set an all-time record, up +69.8% YoY, at a 20.1% margin (source) — nearly 660bps above the year-ago quarter and more than 6.5 points above the prior-best quarter (13.8% in 2023Q3). Adjusted diluted EPS of $0.14 beat the $0.01 consensus by +1,300% (a small-base effect, but a real swing from Q2'25's $0.00 and Q1'26's -$0.36 miss). GAAP diluted EPS was essentially breakeven at -$0.02.

The offset: the beat is broad, but two features cut against reading it as a clean new run-rate. First, revenue growth decelerated -699bps QoQ (+21.2% in Q1'26 to +14.2% in Q2'26) — still double-digit and still a record dollar quarter, but the deceleration is real, not just optics, and consensus has it decelerating further to +8.5% YoY by Q3'26. Second, FY2025's GAAP net loss widened to $632.4M from $352.6M in FY2024 despite better adjusted EBITDA that year — a below-the-line divergence (financing costs, impairments, or tax, not decomposed in the source tasks) that remains unreconciled and tempers the "accelerating" read on a per-share basis.

Guidance: the only formal, quantitative guidance change was full-year 2026 net CapEx raised to $200 million-$235 million (from $175M-$225M), a midpoint increase of +$17.5M (+8.75%). CFO Sean Goodman characterized the raise as opportunistic ("increasing some of the projects ahead of the Q4 slate," landlord co-funding) rather than a structural step-up, and explicitly declined to extend it into 2027. AMC still issues no formal revenue, EBITDA, EPS, or margin range — only qualitative commentary ("significantly rising revenues," "strongest post-pandemic year").

Tone: the most confident of the last three calls — "what a quarter, what a quarter, what a quarter" — with record language repeated roughly six times and the free-cash-flow framing moving from "not quite breakeven" to "ever so close" on a trailing-twelve-month basis, anchored to a stated ~$10.4 billion annual box-office breakeven level.

Contradictions (2 found): (1) a real, three-statement conflict — Adam Aron told the Q1'26 call the $155.8M debt-to-equity conversion was both still "in progress" and already "completed" in the same call, and CFO Sean Goodman then re-attributed the same action to Q2 2026 on the following call; (2) a minor one — global Dolby Cinema screen count dropped from 178 to 177 between Q2'25 and Q3'25 despite an active expansion plan.

Catalysts to watch into Q3'26 (reports 2026-11-04): Spider-Man: Brand-New Day opens 2026-07-31 on the best U.S. presales in ~5 years (tracking $180M-$228M domestic open); the ~$51M/yr interest step-down and the 2026-07-24 redemption of the last pre-2029 debt maturity are now realized; the highest-conviction risk items are the two deflected Street questions — 2H26/FY27 pricing runway and whether the FY26 CapEx range is a new run-rate.

| Metric | Q3'24 | Q4'24 | Q1'25 | Q2'25 | Q3'25 | Q4'25 | Q1'26 | Q2'26 | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | Revenue ($M) | 1,348.8 | 1,306.4 | 862.5 | 1,397.9 | 1,300.2 | 1,288.3 | 1,045.4 | 1,596.7 | | Revenue YoY % | -4.1% | +18.3% | -9.3% | +35.6% | -3.6% | -1.4% | +21.2% | +14.2% | | Attendance (M) | 65.1 | 62.4 | 41.9 | 62.8 | 58.4 | 56.3 | 47.6 | 71.3 | | Attendance YoY % | -11.5% | +20.2% | -10.1% | +25.6% | -10.3% | -9.8% | +13.6% | +13.5% | | Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | 161.8 | 164.8 | -58.0 | 189.2 | 122.2 | 134.1 | 38.3 | 321.4 | | Adj. EBITDA margin % | 12.0% | 12.6% | -6.7% | 13.5% | 9.4% | 10.4% | 3.7% | 20.1% | | Margin YoY (bps)¹ | -180 | +880 | -340 | +1,060 | -260 | -220 | +1,040 | +660 | | Adj. diluted EPS | -$0.04 | -$0.18 | -$0.58 | $0.00 | -$0.21 | -$0.18 | -$0.36 | $0.14 | | GAAP diluted EPS (ref.) | -$0.06 | -$0.35 | -$0.47 | -$0.01 | -$0.58 | -$0.25 | -$0.22 | -$0.02 |

¹ Adjusted EBITDA margin YoY change, computed from the margin row above. Attendance has now declined two full fiscal years running (224.2M in FY2024, 219.4M in FY2025) even as revenue and EBITDA grew, confirming the improvement is pricing/mix and cost discipline, not a volume recovery.

Verdict — accelerating on a multi-quarter view, decelerating sequentially. Q2 2026 set all-time records for both revenue and adjusted EBITDA, and marks the fourth consecutive positive-YoY revenue print — the first time in this dataset that has happened (2024 had only one positive quarter out of four). But the YoY growth rate itself eased for the second straight quarter (Q4'25 -1.4% → Q1'26 +21.2% → Q2'26 +14.2%), which is a high-base effect (Q2'25 was itself +35.7% YoY) rather than a demand problem — AMC continued to take ~70-170bps of share from the industry on both continents this quarter.

| Quarter | Adj. EPS Cons. | Adj. EPS Actual | EPS Beat/Miss | Revenue Actual | Revenue Beat/Miss | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | 2024Q3 | -$0.07 | -$0.04 | 🟢 +42.9% | $1,348.8M | n/a — consensus not recovered | | 2024Q4 | -$0.16 | -$0.18 | 🔴 -12.5% | $1,306.4M | n/a — consensus not recovered | | 2025Q1 | -$0.61 | -$0.58 | 🟢 +4.9% | $862.5M | n/a — consensus not recovered | | 2025Q2 | -$0.01 | $0.00 | 🟢 Beat (breakeven vs. modest expected loss) | $1,397.9M | n/a — consensus not recovered | | 2025Q3 | -$0.19 | -$0.21 | 🔴 -10.5% | $1,300.2M | 🟢 +5.3% | | 2025Q4 | -$0.20 | -$0.18 | 🟢 +7.7% | $1,288.3M | 🟢 +0.5% | | 2026Q1 | -$0.32 | -$0.36 | 🔴 -14.3% | $1,045.4M | 🟢 +4.8% | | ▶ 2026Q2 (THIS QTR) | $0.01 | $0.14 | 🟢 +1,300% | $1,596.7M | 🟢 +5.7% |

| Window | Adj. EPS beat rate | Revenue beat rate (where recovered) | |---|---|---| | L12Q | 7/12 = 58.3% | 4/4 recovered quarters, all beats; trailing-4Q avg surprise +3.7% | | L4Q | 2/4 = 50.0% (miss-beat-miss-beat, exactly alternating) | 4/4 = 100% |

Read: revenue is the more reliably-beaten line (every quarter with a recovered consensus figure has beaten), while adjusted EPS alternates miss-beat-miss-beat with no run of more than two in either direction — this quarter's +1,300% surprise is a step-change tied to the specific slate/cost-discipline dynamics in this quarter, off a consensus base ($0.01) so small that even a modest dollar beat produces an extreme percentage surprise, not evidence of a newly consistent beater. The two largest historical misses (2024Q1 -25.8%, 2024Q2 -330%, both pre-profitability) are much larger in magnitude than the two most recent misses (2025Q3 -10.5%, 2026Q1 -14.3%), suggesting Street estimates have converged tighter as AMC approached breakeven.

Scope note: AMC gives no formal quarterly or annual revenue/EBITDA/EPS/margin guidance — only qualitative directional commentary. Full-year net CapEx is the sole hard, dollar-denominated number the company guides.

Guided items — prior vs. new

| Guidance item | Prior (Q1'26 call) | New (Q2'26 call) | Change | |---|---|---|---| | Revenue | "Significantly rising revenues" (qualitative) | Reiterated; reporting record revenue as delivered, not forward-framed | Unchanged qualitative | | Adjusted EBITDA | No range; operating-leverage thesis | No range; ~66% flow-through cited as realized evidence | Unchanged qualitative, now evidenced | | Adjusted EBITDA margin | Not guided | Not guided; 20.1% (+660bps YoY) cited as proof of leverage, not a run-rate target | No forward target | | Free cash flow | "Not quite breakeven neutral… but boy, are we close" | Same phrasing repeated, plus new reference point: ~$10.4bn annual breakeven box office | Unchanged qualitative + new anchor | | Net CapEx (FY2026) | $175M-$225M (reaffirmed) | Raised to $200M-$235M | +$17.5M / +8.75% at midpoint | | Leverage target | Not previously time-boxed | Long-term target "around 3x" stated explicitly for the first time; current leverage below 6.5x | New explicit target | | Premium/XL screens | "Double XL count by end of 2026" (Q4'25 framing) | 150-250 more premium/XL screens over "next 2-4 years" | Timing loosened | | Merchandise revenue | Not previously quantified | FY2026 U.S. + European merchandise expected to exceed $100M | New, small-dollar KPI |

CapEx waterfall — the only hard number AMC guides

| Step | Value | |---|---| | Q4 2025 call — original FY2026 guide (low / high) | $175M / $225M | | Q4 2025 call — original midpoint | $200M | | Q1 2026 call — reaffirmed midpoint | $200M (unchanged) | | Q2 2026 call — new guide (low / high) | $200M / $235M | | Q2 2026 call — new midpoint | $217.5M (+$17.5M / +8.75% vs. prior) |

FQ+1 (Q3 2026) and FY+1 (FY2026) — consensus context

| Metric | Q3 2026E (consensus) | vs. prior-year actual | |---|---|---| | Revenue | $1,410.3M (FMP) | Implies +8.5% YoY vs. Q3'25's $1,300.2M — decelerating from Q2's +14.2% | | Adjusted EBITDA | $373.8M (FMP) | Implies +205.9% YoY vs. Q3'25's $122.2M — inflated by a weak Q3'25 comp base, not read as accelerating operating leverage | | Diluted EPS | -$0.046 (FMP) | Improvement vs. Q3'25's -$0.58, consistent with the narrowing-loss trend |

| Metric | FY2026E (consensus) | vs. FY2025 actual | |---|---|---| | Revenue | $5,496M (FMP) | +13.3% YoY implied vs. $4,848.9M; H1'26 actual already ran +16.9% YoY, implying H2 deceleration to roughly +10.3% | | Adjusted EBITDA | $1,457M (FMP) | +275.8% YoY implied — a ~$340M gap vs. a bottoms-up build (~$1,117M); flagged as a consensus data-quality inconsistency, not a company figure | | Diluted EPS | -$0.237 (FMP) | Narrowing-loss trajectory; H1'26 actual EPS already -$0.24, implying H2'26 consensus near breakeven | | Net CapEx | Not tracked by sell-side | New guide: $200M-$235M ($217.5M midpoint, +8.75% vs. prior) |

Management tone — three most recent calls

| Dimension | Q4 2025 call | Q1 2026 call | Q2 2026 call | |---|---|---|---| | Overall tone | Optimistic but cautious ("not out of the woods yet") | Confident, "far superior to consensus" | Most confident of the three — "what a quarter" x6 | | Revenue framing | Forward expectation | Same, repeated verbatim | Reported as delivered; forward focus shifts to H2 slate | | Operating leverage | Introduced as "the two most important words" | Reiterated | Reiterated with hard evidence (66% flow-through, +660bps margin) | | CapEx tone | "Incredibly disciplined," reaffirmed range | "Remains the same," reaffirmed | Range raised; framed as timing/opportunistic, not less disciplined | | Free cash flow | Needs a strong 2027 slate too | "Not quite… but boy, are we close" | Same framing, plus new $10.4bn breakeven anchor | | Leverage/balance sheet | Priorities: liquidity, lower cost, extend maturities | Refinancing executed; $155.8M converted | Explicit ~3x long-term target; leverage below 6.5x, down from double-digit 6 months ago |

Net read: guidance quality moved from "reiterated qualitative" to "reiterated qualitative plus one opportunistic quantitative raise" — a genuine but narrow signal. The CapEx raise and loosened XL-screen timing are the only data points suggesting management is trading some prior capital discipline for opportunistic spend during a strong slate window.

| Metric | Q3'24 | Q4'24 | Q1'25 | Q2'25 | Q3'25 | Q4'25 | Q1'26 | Q2'26 | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | Revenue YoY % | -4.1% | +18.3% | -9.3% | +35.6% | -3.6% | -1.4% | +21.2% | +14.2% | | Rev accel (bps QoQ) | +1,948 | +2,235 | -2,763 | +4,499 | -3,925 | +221 | +2,260 | -699 | | Diluted EPS (GAAP) | -$0.06 | -$0.35 | -$0.47 | -$0.01 | -$0.58 | -$0.25 | -$0.22 | -$0.02 |

EPS YoY% is flagged NM in most quarters above (near-zero/sign-flipping bases make percentage changes economically misleading — e.g., Q2'26's -$0.02 vs. Q2'25's -$0.01 is a 1-cent move that reads as a mechanical -100%). The dollar-level trend is the reliable read: losses per share narrowed almost every quarter from -$0.83 (Q4'23) to consistently sub-$0.25 levels through 2025-2026, arriving at essentially breakeven (-$0.02) in Q2'26.

Inflection points:

1. Q4'24 → Q1'25 (deceleration into contraction): +18.3% to -9.3% (-2,763bps) as the slate thinned versus Q1'24's Dune: Part Two/Godzilla x Kong comps.
2. Q1'25 → Q2'25 (sharpest inflection, acceleration): -9.3% to +35.6% (+4,499bps), the largest single move in the series, on a weak Q2'24 base plus a strong Q2'25 slate.
3. Q2'25 → Q3'25 (mean-reversion): +35.6% to -3.6% (-3,925bps) as the Q2'25 comp normalized — the mirror image of the prior quarter's spike.
4. Q1'26 → Q2'26 (deceleration but still double-digit): +21.2% to +14.2% (-699bps) even as absolute revenue hit an all-time high of $1,596.7M — a high-base effect (Q2'25 was itself +35.6% YoY), not weakening demand.

Plain-English assessment: the eight-quarter arc is a volatile saw-tooth largely driven by film-slate comp timing, not a secular trend — every double-digit swing up has been followed within one or two quarters by a reversal tied to the comp base. What changed in the most recent two quarters is that AMC strung together back-to-back positive prints (Q1'26 +21.2%, Q2'26 +14.2%) without the usual air-pocket reversal, while simultaneously setting all-time-record revenue and adjusted EBITDA — the first time in this series a quarter has been an outright record rather than a comp-driven bounce. Per management: domestic admissions revenue grew 11.4% versus 10.7% industry-wide (~70bps of share gain), European attendance grew 17.9% versus industry growth ~170bps slower, and roughly $200M of incremental YoY revenue converted to $131.9M of incremental adjusted EBITDA (~66% flow-through) — evidence, per management, that AMC no longer needs a full volume recovery to pre-pandemic levels to earn pre-pandemic-or-better EBITDA.

| # | Catalyst | Timing | Read-through | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | Spider-Man: Brand-New Day (Sony) | Opens 2026-07-31 | Best U.S. presales in ~5 years (record-holder was No Way Home); 3-week tracking $180M-$190M domestic open, long-range as high as ~$228M; would beat Toy Story 5's $159.6M as 2026's biggest opening YTD | | 2 | The Odyssey (Universal/Nolan) | Opened 2026-07-18 | Media-reported $124M domestic opening; 95%/97% critic/audience RT scores; IMAX-shot film drove premium screens (~8% of AMC's total) to over 50% of its ticket gross | | 3 | Q4 2026 tentpole slate (Avengers: Doomsday 12/18, Jumanji: Open World 12/11, Violent Night 2 12/4, Hunger Games: Sunrise on the Reaping 11/20) | Nov-Dec 2026 | Underpins full-year 2026 domestic box-office consensus; flag — Aron named a Warner Bros. "Dune: Part Two" for the slate, but external release calendars list "Dune: Part Three" for Q4 2026 — discrepancy noted, not resolved | | 4 | Debt leverage-trigger interest step-down | Realized in Q2 2026 | ~$51M/yr annual interest expense reduction on ~75% of debt from a leverage-covenant trigger, plus ~$16M/yr from the Q2 refinancing | | 5 | $125.5M subordinated notes redemption (6.125% due 2027) | Redeemed 2026-07-24 | Removes the only debt maturity inside management's "no material maturities before 2029" runway | | 6 | PLF/XL screen expansion (third-party-capital-funded) | 150-250 more screens over next 2-4 years | Premium/XL screens are ~8% of total screens but generated over 50% of The Odyssey's ticket gross — a concrete same-quarter proof point | | 7 | FY2026 domestic box-office recovery (macro) | Full calendar year 2026 | Gower Street ~$9.9B (+11% YoY), Cinelytic ~$9.6B (+11%), B. Riley raised to $9.55B — all back management's "strongest post-pandemic year" framing; Q2 industry box office already ran +10.7% YoY | | 8 | Sell-side re-rating post-print | 2026-07-08 through 2026-07-21 | Wedbush (Outperform) and Benchmark (Buy) both raised estimates; Macquarie (Neutral, pre-print) also raised — directionally positive analyst revisions across the coverage set | | 9 | Annual FCF-breakeven box-office level (~$10.4B) | Structural; next checkpoint Q3'26 (2026-11-04) | Q2 2026 alone was FCF-positive ($190.1M); management says "not quite" cleared on a trailing-12-month basis but "ever so close" | | 10 | Competitive intensity (Cinemark, Regal/Cineworld) | Ongoing | AMC claims pricing-power outperformance vs. peer exhibitors; not independently tracked this run |

Next scheduled earnings: 2026-11-04 (Q3 2026) — the checkpoint where the Spider-Man/Odyssey Q3 box-office read-through, the Q4 tentpole setup, and the annual FCF-breakeven trendline all become measurable.

8 Q&A exchanges taken on the Q2 2026 call before it was cut short by market open; 6 Well Answered, 2 Deflected/Avoided.

| # | Analyst | Topic | Verdict | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | Mike Hickey (StoneX) | Cost-discipline sustainability into 2H26 | 🟢 Well answered — candid that full margin improvement "remains to be seen" quarter to quarter | | 2 | Mike Hickey (StoneX) | Box-office level needed for sustained FCF | 🟢 Well answered — precise ~$10.4bn trailing-12-month figure with mechanics explained | | 3 | Alicia Reese (Wedbush) | European PLF/XL build-out progress | 🟢 Well answered — quantified premium-format pricing ($6-7 IMAX/Dolby premium, ~10% XL) and economics | | 4 | Alicia Reese (Wedbush) | European recliner/premium ROI vs. U.S. | 🟢 Well answered — specific ROI ranges (30%+/40%+/50%+), XL "pretty much infinite" | | 5 | Chad Beynon (Macquarie) | 2H26/FY27 admissions & concessions pricing runway | 🔴 Deflected/Avoided — Aron cited legal restrictions on forward pricing talk and pivoted to backward-looking anecdotes; the forward question was never answered | | 6 | Patrick Sholl (Barrington) | Target leverage level | 🟢 Well answered — specific ~3x target vs. current below-6.5x level, with the two levers named | | 7 | Patrick Sholl (Barrington) | Is the new CapEx range a FY27 run-rate? | 🔴 Deflected/Avoided — CFO explicitly declined to extend the range into 2027, gave no directional signal despite being asked twice | | 8 | Retail shareholder (read by Sean Goodman) | Rationale for the two Q2 equity raises | 🟢 Well answered — tied raises directly to $125.5M debt repayment and the "cash is king" COVID-era survival lesson |

Both deflections concern the same underlying question: how much of Q2's operating leverage and cash generation is repeatable. The pricing-power question bears directly on the per-patron-revenue driver of the beat; the CapEx question bears directly on the free-cash-flow breakeven narrative management otherwise leaned on heavily this call.

Areas checked and found consistent (not contradictions): theater open/close counts reconcile across all 7 transcripts on hand; quarterly adjusted EBITDA figures cited on each call match the Daloopa-sourced series above; the 9-month-2025 free-cash-flow-positive goal was floated, reiterated, and then confirmed achieved; IMAX (220→223→225→226) and XL (151→168→193) screen counts both increase monotonically and tie out; the pre-2029 debt-maturity claim (identifying the $125.5M 2027 notes as the sole remaining maturity, then confirming their redemption) builds correctly across calls. A separate, non-hard-contradiction tension worth watching: the CapEx range was called "very tight" and disciplined across four straight calls, then raised mid-year — management gave an explicit rationale (high-ROI opportunities this year) rather than contradicting itself, so it is flagged as a watch-item, not a contradiction.

Macro commentary:

• Inflation/costs: management acknowledged seven years of cumulative inflation and wage pressure but framed AMC's per-patron profitability gains and cost control as having outrun it — a headwind other, lower-scale exhibitors without AMC's premium-format mix may not have absorbed as well.
• Interest rates: no independent macro rate call; commentary was scoped to AMC's own capital structure (leverage-triggered step-downs), assuming a stable-to-benign benchmark-rate backdrop as the 2026 base case.
• Consumer/discretionary spend: management framed cinema as a relative-value option — an analyst (Chad Beynon, Macquarie) noted movie tickets are "affordable compared to other out-of-home options, particularly... World Cup pricing, concerts this summer" — a positive-for-cinema, cautionary-for-premium-live-events signal on consumer price sensitivity.
• Industrial/B2B sentiment: not addressed — not a relevant theme for an exhibition-industry call.

Company mentions:

| Company | Role | Read-through | |---|---|---| | Universal Pictures | Studio (The Odyssey) | Strong $124M opening; positive for Universal and for AMC's IMAX attach (film shot entirely on IMAX cameras) | | Sony Pictures | Studio (Spider-Man: Brand-New Day) | Record advance bookings cited by management; positive for Sony and AMC's Q3 attendance momentum | | Warner Bros. Discovery | Studio (Dune franchise) | Cited as a marquee 2H26 title anchoring the "strongest post-pandemic year" framing (see Dune "Part Two" vs. "Part Three" flag above) | | Walt Disney Company | Studio (Avengers: Doomsday + 3 other Q2 openers) | Three Disney titles among the six $75M+ Q2 openers; Doomsday cited as a key Q4 catalyst | | Lionsgate / A24 | Studios | Evidence Q2 box-office strength was broad-based across major and specialty studios | | IMAX Corporation | Premium-format partner | Premium/XL screens were ~8% of AMC's screens but 50% of The Odyssey's gross — reinforces IMAX's premium economics | | Dolby Laboratories | Premium-format partner | $6-7 ticket premium confirmed sustained for Dolby Cinema | | Unnamed peer exhibitors (Cinemark, Regal/Cineworld) | Direct competitors | AMC explicitly claims pricing-power outperformance vs. "all the other large mass operators" | | Live-event/sports promoters (World Cup, concerts) | Competing discretionary spend | Positioned as the pricier alternative to cinema — a relative share-of-wallet tailwind for AMC |

AMC delivered its best operating quarter in the dataset — record revenue, record adjusted EBITDA, a 20.1% margin, and near-breakeven EPS — driven by attendance/share gains and real operating leverage (~66% flow-through), not a full volume recovery (attendance is still below FY2023 peak levels). But the equity-level picture remains only partly resolved: revenue growth decelerated sequentially even as dollars hit a record, FY2025's GAAP net loss widened despite better EBITDA and remains unreconciled, and management would not confirm whether either the pricing runway or the CapEx level driving this quarter's results is repeatable into FY27. The next checkpoint — Q3 2026 earnings on 2026-11-04 — is where the Spider-Man/Odyssey box-office read-through and the durability of this quarter's cost discipline become testable rather than qualitative.